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RITING makes lawyers, as the general opinion goes. That is
why a number of law schools design their programs to push
students into writing early. Beginning in the first semester,
they are trained to prepare briefs, office memoranda, and letters to cli-
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1. Exodus 22:26.
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ents.2 Legal writing has become the new legal rhetoric. 3 This, however,
comes as a surprise to those who believe that lawyers should know about
the law before writing on it.4 It also does not fit well with St. Paul's re-
mark, that "the letter kills,"'5 and is even more troublesome for those who
think that law is more than "words, words, words."' 6 We believe that law-
yers should know the facts they are writing about.7 The Latin rule "Da
mihi facta, dabo tibi ius" ("Give me the facts, I will give you the law"),
probably expresses best what it means to be "thinking like a lawyer," 8 if
there is such a thing as legal reasoning beyond drawing smart conclu-
sions.9 But today, law appears to be a realm of words and-in particu-
lar-of letters.' 0
A. LITERAL FORMALISM
Turning to literal formalism,1 1 lawyers gave up their competence for
economics and accepted the view that economic analysis of law should
reign supreme (i.e., that law should be governed by the wisdom of the
markets). This idea claimed to be "in a symbiotic relation with real world
2. For a good reason, as the Multistate Performance Test that is administered by
many U.S. jurisdictions in connection with their state bar examination tests a can-
didate's writing skills by focusing on questions covering legal analysis, fact analysis,
problem solving, resolution of ethical dilemmas, organization, and management of
a lawyering task and communication.
3. See Teresa Godwin Phelps, The New Legal Rhetoric, 40 Sw. L.J. 1089 (1986).
4. Marcus Porcius Cato Censorius (Cato Major) already noted around 200 B.C.:
"Rem tene, verba sequantur" ("If you are in control of the subject matter the
words will follow"). Latin Quotes & Phrases-Q & R, http://www.yuni.com/library/
latin_6.html (last visited June 26, 2009). For a more recent example, see Stephen
B. Cohen, Words! Words! Words!: Teaching the Language of Tax, 55 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 600 (2005).
5. 2 Corinthians 3:6. "For the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life."
6. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2, line 192.
7. See generally William Twining, Taking Facts Seriously-Again, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC.
360 (2005).
8. Academic Dictionaries & Encyclopedias: Hodie mihi, cras tibi, http://
dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/latin-proverbs/1002/Hodie (last visited June 26, 2009). Cf.
Danny Priel, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 57 J. LEGAL EDUC. 579 (2007) (reviewing
Lloyd L. Weinreb, Legal Reason: The Use of Analogy in Legal Argument (2005));
J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Role of Reason in the Rule of Law, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
779 (1989).
9. Priel, supra note 8. Cf. Larry Alexander, The Banality of Legal Reasoning, 73
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 517, 517 (1998) ("Thinking like a lawyer is just ordinary
forms of thinking clearly and well."). See also Joseph Raz, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN: ESSAY IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 238 (rev. ed. Oxford
1994).
10. Cf. Cohen, supra note 4; David Dyzenhaus, Nicola Lacey's A Life of HLA Hart:
The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 606, (2005) (book re-
view). See generally Robert A. Pascal, A Summary Reflection on Legal Education,
69 LA. L. REV. 125 (2008).
11. See JEAN STEFANIC & RICHARD DELGADO, How LAWYERS LOSE THEIR WAY: A
PROFESSION FAILS ITS CREATIVE MINDS (2005). See also Milton C. Regan, Jr.,
Jean Stefanic and Richard Delgado, How Lawyers Lose Their Way: A Profession
Fails Its Creative Minds, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 454 (2005) (book review).
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transactions."' 12 and has spread around the world 13 largely due to its "in-
tellectual fit.' 4 Imposing its particular vision of the world as the only
valid one, the idea became a scientific 'prison', leading to self-deceptive
rationalizations. We became "captives of formalism."' 5 This develop-
ment was often criticized, 16 but so far without much success.' 7 The entic-
ing ideology of perfect markets has continued to hold the supreme
position.
Economic analysis of law took possession of corporate law like a
'revolution.' It swept aside the valuable lessons from the book "The
Modern Corporation and Private Property,"' 8 by Adolf Augustus Berle
and Gardiner Coit Means, and replaced them with "the confident belief
that markets could self-regulate." 19 Competition for incorporation reve-
nues was hailed as the "genius of American corporate law,"'20 reaching a
climax beyond which no further development seemed to be possible-
"The End of History for Corporate Law." 21
B. ECONOMIC REALITY
But then reality caught up as we experienced Enron,22 WorldCom, 23
and the 'counter-revolution' of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Yet, to-
day we are suffering from the fall-out of the subprime mortgage bubble
burst. On September 17, 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. collapsed
12. Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 342,
348 (2005).
13. Cf. Florian Faust, Comparative Law and the Economic Analysis of Law, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 837 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard
Zimmermann eds., 2006).
14. Romano, supra note 12, at 351.
15. Regan, supra note 11, at 454-455.
16. James Boyd White, Law, Economics, and Torture, L. QUADRANGLE NOTES, Sum-
mer 2008, at 98, 101. (arguing with Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus Purposi-
vism in First Amendment Analysis, 54 STAN. L. REV. 737, 739 (2002)).
17. Cf. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
18. ADOLF AUGUSTUS BERLE & GARDINER COlT MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORA-
TION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1968).
19. Richard Parker, The Crisis Last Time, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2008, at 55, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/09/books/review/Parker-t.html.
20. Cf. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 149 (2003);
ROBERTA ROMANO, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, FOUNDA-
TIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 87 (Roberta Romano ed., 1993); Romano, supra note
12, at 348.
21. Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439 (2001); See also Sebastian Mock, Review Essay-Perspectives of Reg-
ulatory Competition in European Company Law, 6 GERMAN L.J. 741, 771-792
(2005).
22. See generally CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POST-ENRON: COMPARATIVE AND IN-
TERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Joseph J. Norton, Jonathan Rickford & Jan
Kleineman eds., 2006).
23. Cf. Thomas Zaccaro, Jesse Weiss, & Michelle Reed, Due Diligence Standards for
Underwriters After WorldCom, 13 CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, No. 2 at 1
(2005).
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with assets overvalued by more than US$ 30 billion.24 On October 3,
2008, "the U.S. stock market[s] lost roughly $1.5 trillion in value. '25
From June 29, 2007, to December 31, 2008, the Federal National Mort-
gage Association's 26 market capitalization depreciated from US$ 63.569
billion to US$ 4.096 billion. At the close of November 21, 2006, Fannie
Mae's shares traded at US$ 57.89, at the close of November 21, 2007, the
stock price was US$ 29.23, and at the close of November 21, 2008, the
stock price was only US030. 27 It is a small wonder that the concept of
genius "has worn thin in recent academic work."'28
C. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF ECONOMICS
But, fortunately, law is more than economics. It serves to analyze and
correct the orientation of economics that cannot operate without a value
system. Law and economics constantly interact with each other. There-
fore, the legal analysis of economics is as important as the economic anal-
ysis of law.
A prime example for this interaction is the field of accounting, often
neglected by lawyers. 29 As soon as financial statements are released to
the public, they leave the realms of internal business administration and
become a legal disclosure issue.30 Another example is companies that
have become "too big to [let] fail."' 31 The law has to either deny such
growth or provide regulations that aim to prevent such companies from
needing a government bailout. The same is true when economic concepts
overburden markets with complexity. The law then has to provide for
24. Jon Hilsenrath, Deborah Solomon, & Damian Paletta, Crisis Mode: Paulson,
Bernanke Strained for Consensus in Bailout, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2008, at A2,
A16.
25. Id. As a comparison, the bursting of the 1998-2000 "Internet Bubble" was accom-
panied by a decline in the value of equity securities that may have reached as much
as $7.4 trillion. CHARLES J. JOHNSON, JR. & JOSEPH McLAUGHLIN, CORPORATE
FINANCE AND THE SECURITIES LAWS 1-5 (4th ed. 2007).
26. Hereinafter "Fannie Mae."
27. Deborah Solomon, James R. Hagerty, & Michael Crittenden, Strains Mount on
Bailout Plans, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2008, at Al, A14.
28. MARK J. ROE, DELAWARE'S BACKSTOP 3 (2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1304165.
29. Or as Joseph McLaughlin frequently puts it in his speeches: "Accounting is too
important to leave it to the accountants." Axel Weber, President of Deutsche
Bundesbank, in his Opening Statement to the Panel Discussion "Finance after the
Turmoil: Shape of Markets and Regulation" at the 18th Frankfurt European
Banking Congress (Nov. 21, 2008), available at http://www.bundesbank.de/
download/presse/reden/2008/20081121.weber.en.php.
30. See generally Bernhard Grossfeld, Comparative Accounting, 28 TEX. INT'L L.J. 233(1993); Bernhard Grossfeld, Lawyers and Accountants: A Semiotic Competition,
36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 167 (2001); Bernhard Grossfeld, Comparative Corporate
Governance: Generally Accepted Accounting Principles v. International Accounting
Standards?, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 847 (2003); BERNHARD GROSSFELD,
Global Accounting: A Challenge for Lawyers, LAW, CULTURE AND ECONOMIC DE-
VELOPMENT: A LIBER AMICORUM FOR PROFESSOR ROBERTO MACLEAN 143 (Jo-
seph J. Norton and C. Paul Rogers III eds., 2007).
31. That is, the government would rather inject new cash in such companies than let
them go out of business (bailout).
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transparency in the interest of fair information and equal playing fields in
order to achieve socially balanced results (i.e. "statistical reasoning in
law" 32). Our neglect, in these areas, of the legal analysis of economics
contributed to the subprime mortgage fiasco.
II. SUBPRIME MORTGAGE FIASCO33
"We realized rather late [that] we were trapped in our own concepts
which we took for reality. ",34
The trust in letters and the refinements of literal complexity seem to
have played a decisive role in the subprime mortgage crisis.35 Mortgage
securitization confronts us with a world built of many thousand parcels of
land and buildings and many thousand contracts and disclosure docu-
ments filled with many hundred thousand words made of millions of let-
ters. It is a formulaic, "letteral" approach painting reality as a pointillist
composite.
A. MORTGAGE SECURITIZATION
In the United States, borrowers typically turn to mortgage brokers.36
Such brokers then place their customer's loan application with a lender
that issues the credit and receives a note secured by a mortgage in return.
Unlike, for example, in Germany where mortgage lenders tend to keep
the credit they extend on their books,37 U.S. lenders quickly refinance
themselves by selling their notes and the related mortgages to other fi-
nancial institutions, typically located on Wall Street. Such institutions
then pool such notes and mortgages with many other notes and mort-
gages in special purpose vehicles 38 that issue new notes to the public,
thereby transforming non-liquid assets via a paper construct into ex-
change traded, asset-backed securities (ABS).3 9 This process is com-
monly referred to as "mortgage securitization."
32. Cf. JOSEPH L. GASTWIRTH, 1 STATISTICAL REASONING IN LAW AND PUBLIC POL-
ICY (1988).
33. Gary Gorton, The Panic of 2007 (Aug. 4, 2008)(prepared for the Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City Jackson Hole Conference), http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/
sympos/2008/Gorton.08.04.08.pdf; Gretchen Morgenson, How the Thundering
Herd Faltered and Fell, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, at 1.
34. Bernhard Grossfeld, Global Financial Statements/Local Enterprise Valuation, 29 J.
CORP. L. 337, 361-62 (2004).
35. Regarding the importance of written (in contrast to oral) securities disclosure, see
Hansjoerg Heppe, Is There a Need for New Rule-Making: Securities Offerings, the
Internet, and the SEC, 31 SEC. REG. L.J. 50, 67 et seq. (2003).
36. See Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and
the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 553 (2002) (stat-
ing that mortgage brokers originate more than sixty percent of all residential loans
in the United States).
37. And earn profit from collecting principal and interest.
38. E.g., Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. used Structured Asset Securities Corporation
to securitize its residential mortgages.
39. Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current
Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1369, 1373 (1991).
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It was originally developed by Ginnie Mae40 in the 1970s and quickly
became the 'virtuous work' of Freddie Mac41 and Fannie Mae.42 Up until
2008, the size and importance of the ABS market became enormous. At
the end of 2007, there were US$ 9.7 trillion ABS outstanding, of which
US$ 7.2 trillion were mortgage-backed securities.43
B. SUBPRIME BORROWERS
The crisis began when the industry started to market towards low-in-
come borrowers. Specific subprime mortgage forms were developed for
advertising and selling credit in predominantly low-income neighbor-
hoods, often comprised of minority communities. 44 Typically, borrowers
under such forms are less educated than non-subprime borrowers;45 let-
ters do not reign supreme in their minds. However, just as with the
securitization of prime mortgages, refinancing subprime lending profited
from the structured, letteral appearance of ABS issues that was enhanced
by being accounted for according to generally accepted accounting princi-
ples. Positive ratings from credit-rating agencies gave subprime ABS
their final touch that originally helped to sustain these 'houses of cards.' 46
III. SYSTEMIC ANALYSIS
The trend is to blame the actors and their greed for the subprime mort-
gage crisis. But that seems too simple. We doubt whether certain indi-
viduals or institutions can be responsible for a crisis of this dimension.
Most of us are making our living in an environment that we do not con-
trol. We are market participants, left with little leeway for a behavior
other than what the markets, in case of the subprime mortgage crisis,
what the international financial markets, perceive as being good. As mar-
ket participants, we will be punished if our performance is not in line with
industry or general trends. Similarly, investors will not buy bonds if they
do not yield a sufficient return and will sell stock if a company's manage-
40. Formally known as the Government National Mortgage Association.
41. Formally known as the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation.
42. Julia P. Forrester, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Mortgage Instruments: The
Forgotten Benefit to Homeowners, 72 Mo. L. REV. 1077, 1081 et seq. (2007); Ar-
nold Kling, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, An Exit Strategy for the Taxpayer 5 (Cato
Institute, Briefing Paper No. 106, 2008).
43. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2009, TA-
BLE 1159. See also CHARLES J. JOHNSON, JR. & JOSEPH McLAUGHLIN, CORPO-
RATE FINANCE AND THE SECURITIES LAWS 14-3 (4th ed. 2007). The ABS market
was therefore larger than the U.S. Treasury securities market ($4.5 trillion) or the
$5.8 trillion corporate bond market. JOHNSON & McLAUGHLIN, supra (referring
to the U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
2006, TABLE 1185).
44. Eggert, supra note 36, at 574. See also Ricardo Guerra v. GMAC LLC, No. 208
Civ. 01297, 2008 WL 3911765 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 2008) (describing the discrimina-
tion issue).
45. Eggert, supra note 36, at 576.
46. See generally WILLIAM COHAM, HOUSE OF CARDS: A TALE OF HUBRIS AND
WRETCHED EXCESS ON WALL STREET (Random House, 2009).
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ment does not sufficiently focus on shareholder value. Here again, the
markets act as arbiter.
Therefore, as lawyers, we should take a 'bottom-up' approach and ask
ourselves whether there was an intrinsic structure in our legal work that
caused unreliable appearances. Were we aware of the social and eco-
nomic consequences of our legal refinements? Were they too abstract to
reflect reality properly? Were we trying to play the rules as effectively as
possible, without seeing the statistical implications of our play? Did we
sufficiently understand the transactions we were advising on? Did the
enormous amount of 'precise letters' help to create the subprime mort-
gage crisis by contributing to and covering-up the complexity of the sub-
ject matter?
In this article, we will discuss these questions with regard to a mortgage
product that is at the heart of the subprime mortgage crisis, the adjusta-
ble-rate mortgage (ARM) loan. Let us examine the details in a lawyerly
manner.
47
IV. STRUCTURAL OVERVIEW 48
A. "SocIAL" DREAMS
Over the last two decades interest rates in the United States were un-
precedentedly low. One of the reasons for this development was that the
U.S. government tried to realize an American dream: homeownership for
as many people as possible.4 9 In addition, interest paid on mortgages for
primary residences is tax deductible under the U.S. Internal Revenue
Code,50 and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's mission became to provide a
continuous, low-cost source of credit to finance America's housing. 51
Initially, America's dream seemed to become true. An unprecedented
number of people applied for new or refinanced existing mortgages, hav-
ing a good feeling about their interest payments because of the tax de-
ductibility.52 Demand for homes surged, leading (following the laws of
supply and demand in a free market economy) to increasing real estate
prices. The number of U.S. homeowners grew and U.S. homes became
more expensive.
47. See Scott Reynolds Nelson, The Real Great Depression, CHRONICLE REV., Oct. 17,
2008, at B9 (describing similarities between present circumstances and the 1873
crisis).
48. See generally Dustin Fisher, Selling the Payments: Predatory Lending Goes
Primetime, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 587 (2008); JOHN WIEDEMER, REAL ESTATE
FINANCE (6th ed. 2002); HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (Frank
Fabozzi ed., 5th ed. 2001).
49. See generally Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to Subprime "HEL" Was Paved
with Good Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home
Equity Market, 51 S.C. L. REV. 473 (2000).
50. 26 U.S.C. § 163 (2000).
51. See Fannie Mae, http://www.fanniemae.com/about/index.html; Freddie Mac, http:/l
www.freddiemac.com/corporate/company-profile/faqs/.
52. Note that interest on other personal loans is not tax deductible.
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At the same time, taking inflation into account, U.S. treasury interest
rates became so low, they became negative. Thus, financial institutions
made a profit if they took out debt, and financial investors had to look for
riskier, higher yielding returns if they did not want to lose money.
1. Pyramid Scheme
As hope for new business opportunities and profit potentials entered
the scene, however, a pyramid scheme of gigantic proportions began to
unfold.53 Political philanthropy turned into an entrepreneurial venture.
Homeowners that got in early increased their asset base substantially,
without significantly increasing their liabilities, by regularly moving into
more expensive houses.54 Other homeowners refinanced existing mort-
gages to pay for credit card debt55 or took out so called "110% mort-
gages," borrowing more money than their home was worth at the time
the loan was issued. To sustain this scheme of ever-increasing real estate
prices, however, ever new, lower levels of buyers had to be found. The
mortgage industry facilitated this search by lowering the entrance barriers
to obtain loans.56 Ultimately, first time home buyers with bad credit were
targeted. New products were introduced that appeared to be 'affordable'
for low-income borrowers, 57 most notably ARM loans. Suddenly, bad
credit made for good loan candidates.58
At the same time, the securitization of mortgage loans did not only
help to provide a continuous, low-cost source of credit to refinance mort-
gage lenders, it changed the industry's business model by transferring de-
fault risks from the original lenders' books to the ABS investor's
portfolio.59 Lenders no longer earned profits from collecting principal
and interest; instead, producing fees and commissions became the name
of the game, 60 starting a severe disconnect between the person making
the credit decision and the person bearing the default risk.
Making subprime home buyers the new, lowest level of the pyramid
kept America's dream alive and initially rewarded everybody. On the
53. In a pyramid scheme, those near or at the top of the pyramid make a lot of money
on the supplied products, but those at the bottom are left with inventories of prod-
ucts they cannot sell.
54. See 26 U.S.C. § 1031 (2008) (providing for deferral of capital gains).
55. Cf. Debbie Dragon, Should you Refinance Your Home to Pay Off Credit Card
Debt?, http://www.loan.com/truth-about-loans/how-to-pay-off-credit-card-debt
(last visited July 14, 2009).
56. This took place during 2006 and 2007. Cf. Carrick Mollenkamp, Serena Ng, Liam
Pleven and Randall Smith, Behind AIG's Fall. Risk Models Failed to Pass Real-
World Test, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2008, at Al ("... to subprime-mortgage bonds
issued in the worst years of 2006 and 2007.").
57. Based on these assumptions such products were seen as advantageous financial
instruments even for financially weak customers to whom they were pretended as
something "good." See Jo Carillo, Dangerous Loans: Consumer Challenges in Ad-
justable Rate Mortgages, 5 BERKELEY Bus. L. J. 1 (2008).
58. See Douglas McGray, Check Cashers, Redeemed, N.Y. TIMES MAC., Nov. 9, 2008,
at 36.
59. Eggert, supra note 36, at 550-554.
60. Essentially themselves becoming 'agents' for Wall Street.
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one side, prices for new and existing homes continued to rise, but on the
other, loans to subprime borrowers provided for higher default risks and
therefore higher interest rates than loans to non-subprime borrowers.
Because of the higher interest rates, subprime loans paid higher commis-
sions to mortgage brokers. 61 Mortgage lenders, however, did not need to
worry too much about the potential increase in default risks because they
securitized such loans. Similarly, Wall Street intended to move most of
such risks off its books by selling the subprime ABS into the international
financial markets. Investors in these markets, finally, found not only
comfort in the fact that-in case there were to be an event of default-
the holder of the original note and mortgage could foreclose into the
"backing asset."'62 They also found-at least on paper-the returns they
had been looking for to beat inflation. 63
Thus, a seemingly perfect process provided the cash to keep the pyra-
mid scheme growing.64
2. International Nightmare
Under the 'soothing melody of perfect markets,' 65 however, this devel-
opment did not appear as a pyramid scheme. Rising house prices made it
easy to refinance and, while improving their credit history by acting in
compliance with their first mortgage, borrowers with bad credit could in-
crease their credit scores66 and thereby their chances of refinancing their
ARMs with fixed-rate mortgages or taking out second mortgages. Thus,
subprime mortgages did not only seem to make homeownership afforda-
ble for the poor, they also fulfilled commercial hopes. And isn't this what
markets are all about? Bringing together diverse and different interests?
But, unfortunately, the disconnect between the person making the
credit decision and the person bearing the default risk could not be per-
manently ignored, as (i) high level credit liquidity cannot continue for-
ever,67 (ii) buildings wear out and need to be renovated, (iii) new recruits
61. Nightmare Mortgages, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 11, 2006, at 1.
62. The securities were more than just paper.
63. Note that the higher interest rates on subprime loans could be passed on in the
mortgage securitization process. In addition, investors at home or abroad were not
offended by complexity as they relied on Wall Street's good will as financial advis-
ers. Cf. Katharina Bart, Swiss Banks Face a Lehman Probe, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4,
2008, at C3.
64. This also took place during 2006 and 2007. Cf. Mollenkamp et al., supra note 56, at
Al (". . . to subprime-mortgage bonds issued in the worst years of 2006 and
2007.").
65. Or, to put it differently, all this was based on the "scientific" assumption that the
wisdom of the markets (as Adam Smith's "invisible hand") will prevent any abuse.
Bernhard Grossfeld, Language, Poetry and Law: Order Patents, 10 LAW & Bus.
REV. AM. 669, 670 (2004).
66. In the U.S., the "credit score" is a numerical expression based on a statistical anal-
ysis of a person's credit files, to represent the creditworthiness of that person.
67. Landon Thomas Jr. quoting William Conway Jr. who refers to the leveraged buy-
out market, Tight Credit, Tough Times for Buyout Lords, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2008,
at Cl ("I know that this liquidity environment cannot go on forever. [...] And I
know that the longer it lasts, the worse it will be when it ends.").
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on the lower levels of a pyramid find it more difficult to sell their prod-
ucts because there are more competing salesmen for the same product
than when the scheme started, and (iv) a downward economy confronts
borrowers with unemployment and makes them default on their loans.
The situation became dramatic as home prices plunged from October
2007 to October 2008 by 26.6 percent in Los Angeles, by 27.3 percent in
San Francisco and by 28.1 percent in Miami. 68 America's social dream of
increased homeownership became an international financial nightmare.
Its effects are tragically personal. 69 In 2008, investors are believed to
have lost over seventeen trillion dollars (US$ 17,000,000,000,000).7 0
B. ADJUSTABLE-RATE MORTGAGES
One of the mortgage products marketed to low-income borrowers was
the ARM loan. 71 Unlike traditional thirty-year fixed-rate loans that give
cost certainty to borrowers until the respective loan is fully amortized,
interest owed on ARM loans will change over the term of the loan ac-
cording to certain parameters.
1. Endorsement
The impetus came when Alan Greenspan wondered out loud, why not
more Americans were using ARM loans:72
American consumers might benefit if lenders provided greater mort-
gage product alternatives to the traditional fixed-rate mortgage. To
the degree that households are driven by fears of payment shocks
but are willing to manage their own interest rate risks, the traditional
fixed-rate mortgage may be an expensive method of financing a
home.
Mr. Greenspan apparently did not have subprime borrowers in mind, but
his credibility encouraged the mortgage industry to use him as an en-
dorsement for ARM products to all customers.
2. Mechanics
The first parameter that determines the interest rate payable on ARM
loans is the dates on which the interest rate is reset (the Reset Dates).
Up to the first Reset Date, the interest rate of an ARM loan is fixed.73
68. Les Christie, Home Prices See Another Record Plunge, CNN MONEY, Oct. 28,
2008, at 1.
69. Cf. Kate Kelly, His Job at Bear Gone, Mr. Fox Chose Suicide, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6,
2008, at C3.
70. Global Equity Markets End 2008 on a Positive Note; Move Cautiously into 2009,
Reuters, Jan. 6, 2009,available at http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS
159817+06-Jan-2009+PRN20090106.
71. Eggert, supra note 36, at 574. See also Ricardo Guerra v. GMAC LLC v. United
States, 2008 WL 3911765, No. 208 Civ. 01297 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 2008) (describing
the discrimination issue).
72. Benny L. Kass, Greenspan, ARMs and What's Best for You, WASH. POST, Mar. 6,
2004, at F10.
73. Set forth in the note.
THE 2008 BANKRUPTCY OF LITERACY
Thereinafter, it changes, subject to an adjustment cap (the Adjustment
Cap), on each Reset Date until the loan is fully amortized. 74 The fre-
quency of Reset Dates will be set forth in the note. The formula for de-
termining the applicable interest rate of an ARM loan on a Reset Date is
comprised of (i) a variable rate75 as the base interest rate (the Index
Rate), plus (ii) a certain percentage depending on the credit risk of the
borrower (the Margin). 76 Typically, LIBOR 77 is used as the Index Rate.
LIBOR is the interest rate offered for U.S. dollar deposits among certain
London banks. There are several LIBORs depending on the maturity of
the deposit. 78 The specific LIBOR that will be used as Index Rate will be
set forth in the note.79
3. 2/28s and 3/27s
The ARM loans most often marketed to low-income borrowers were
so called "2/28-" or "3/27-ARMs." Just like fixed-rate mortgage loans,
ARM loans typically amortize over thirty years. The difference is, how-
ever, that ARM loans are separated into two periods-here, one of two
years and one of twenty eight years, or one of three years and one of
twenty seven years. In a 2/28-ARM, for example, "2" shows the number
of years to the first Reset Date (the Initial Period); hence, the interest
rate remains fixed for two years. "28" indicates the number of years over
which the rate floats according to movements of the Index Rate (the
Floating Period). The Initial Period of predictable interest payments for
subprime borrowers is therefore comparatively short.
4. Interest Rate Hikes80
To make 2/28- or 3/27-ARMs 'affordable,' such loans often provided
for 'teaser' rates (i.e. interest rate discounts) during the Initial Period. At
the first Reset Date, however, the low monthly payments of the teaser
rate would expire and the interest rate would reset to the then current
Index Rate plus Margin. Teaser rate ARM loans therefore enticed bor-
rowers with affordable initial interest payments but-by the same to-
ken-exposed them to high future increases, limited only by the
Adjustment Cap, as their interest rates become subject to the Index
74. Also set forth in the note.
75. Examples for such rates are the CD Rate, the CMT Rate, the Commercial Paper
Rate, the Eleventh District Cost of Funds Rate, EURIBOR, the Federal Funds
Rate, the Prime Rate, the Treasury'Rate or LIBOR.
76. Or, interest rate = Index Rate + Margin = Adjustable Cap.
77. The London Interbank Offered Rate.
78. LIBORs are quoted from overnight to 12-month maturity.
79. As well as the time and date of the quote of such LIBOR.
80. See generally Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia S. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets:
The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1255 (2002).
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Rate.81 As stated above,8 2 the reason for significant Margins triggering
these interest rate hikes is the high default risk of subprime borrowers. 83
In addition, lenders need to 'make up' for interest rate discounts during
the Initial Period.
According to the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, the spread be-
tween the initial fixed-rate and the rate during the Floating Period typi-
cally ranges from 300 to 600 basis points. 84 On average, an ARM loan
interest rate would therefore increase by an additional 4.5% after the first
Reset Date. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Superior Court re-
viewed 98 ARM loans where the introductory rate varied from 6.1% to
12.4%. 85 On the first Reset Date interest would increase on average by
an additional 3%, with the potential of additional increases every six
months.86 We also found references to interest rate increases from 6.95%
payable during the Initial Period to 11% and 13.95% payable during the
Floating Period, or 7.55% payable during the Initial Period to 13.25%
payable during the Floating Period, 87 averaging a hike of an additional
5.5% after the first Reset Date.
C. REFINANCING PRESSURE
To avoid interest rate hikes on (or after) the first Reset Date, borrow-
ers must therefore refinance ARM loans before such date. Prepayments,
however, do not square well with the securitization process because most
securitizations amortize over thirty years, the term of the underlying
loans. Once a pool has been securitized, all profits are locked in and will
shrink if the number of prepayments becomes bigger than anticipated.
The common prepayment activity of a pool and its accordance with the
forecast during the amortization period is therefore an important concern
for lenders and Wall Street. Let us look at the standard terms of a pre-
payment clause of a fixed-rate note, as well as a prepayment rider to an
ARM note, to see how the industry has addressed this matter:
81. So called "exploding" ARMs. Dustin Fisher, Selling the Payments: Predatory
Lending Goes Primetime, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 587, n.55 (2008) (quoting
Michael D. Calhoun). See also Hearing On "Calculated Risk: Assessing Non-
Traditional Mortgage Products" Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs Subcommittee on Housing and Transportation and Subcommit-
tee on Economic Policy (Sept. 20, 2006) (Testimony of Michael D. Calhoun, Presi-
dent, Center for Responsible Lending), available at http://www.responsiblelending.
org/mortgage-lending/policy-legislation/congress/Testimony-Calhoun092006.pdf.
82. See section above titled "Pyramid Scheme."
83. See Conference of State Bank Supervisors, Statement on Subprime Mortgage
Lending, http://www.csbs.org/Content/NavigationMenu/RegulatoryAffairs/Mort-
gagePolicy/FinalCSBS-AARMR-NACCAStatementonSubprimeLending.pdf.
84. Id. at n. 1.
85. Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, & Fremont Gen. Corp., No. 07-4373-
BLS1 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Feb. 25, 2008), at 10, http://skaddenpractices.skadden.com/
cfs//attach.php?uploadFilelD=79.
86. Id.
87. Calhoun, supra note 81.
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1. Standard Clause
Under a traditional fixed-rate mortgage loan, the borrower is under no
pressure to refinance. A typical sample note does not, therefore, penalize
the borrower's right to prepay principal and reads as follows: 88
BORROWER'S RIGHT TO PREPAY
I have the right to make payments of principal at any time before
they are due. A payment of principal only is known as a 'prepay-
ment.' When I make a prepayment, I will tell the Note Holder in
writing that I am doing so.
I may make a full prepayment or partial prepayments without paying
any prepayment charge. The Note Holder will use all of my prepay-
ments to reduce the amount of principal that I owe under this Note.
If I make a partial prepayment, there will be no changes in the due
date or in the amount of my monthly payment unless the Note
Holder agrees in writing to those changes.
2. Prepayment Penalties
Prepayment uncertainty is, however, an important concern for the
securitization industry. Also, prepayment of principal reduces the
amount of interest that a lender receives on a loan. This is especially true
for teaser rate ARM loans, where discounts given during the Initial Pe-
riod need to be compensated for during the Floating Period. Lenders
therefore try to discourage borrowers from refinancing.
Fourteen of the ninety-eight ARM loans reviewed in Massachusetts
provide for prepayment penalties of up to six months' worth of interest if
the borrower prepaid the note during the Initial Period (due to selling the
home or refinancing the ARM loan).8 9 Farris and Richardson found that
less than two percent of prime mortgages contain prepayment penalty
provisions, versus up to eighty percent of subprime mortgages. 90 Such
penalties ranged between one and six percent of the original loan bal-
ance. 91 A prepayment rider to an ARM note currently in dispute before
the Virginia Eastern District Court reads as follows:
92
BORROWER'S RIGHT TO PREPAY
I have the right to make payments of Principal at any time before
they are due. A payment of Principal only is known as a 'Prepay-
ment.' When I make a Prepayment, I will tell the Note Holder in
writing that I am doing so. I may not designate payment as a Prepay-
88. WILLIAM BRONCHICK, FINANCING SECRETS OF A REAL ESTATE MILLIONAIRE 151
(2003).
89. Fremont Investment & Loan and Fremont General Corp., supra note 85, at 10.
90. JOHN FARRIS & CHRISTOPHER RICHARDSON, THE GEOGRAPHY OF SUBPRIME
MORTGAGE PREPAYMENT PENALTY PATTERNS IN HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 687,
688 (Fannie Mae Found. 2004).
91. Bronchick, supra note 88, at 49.
92. Statement of Undisputed Facts by Lisa Barrigan, Elite Funding, Decision One.
Attach. 1 Ex. 20, Barrigan v. Elite Funding et al, No. 1:07 Civ. 0951 (E.D. Va. Sept.
20, 2007).
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ment if I have not made all the monthly payments due under the
Note.
I may make a partial prepayment without paying any prepayment
charge. If I make a full prepayment within one (1) year of the date
of this Note, I agree to pay a prepayment charge of 2% of the
amount being prepaid; if a make a full prepayment more than one
(1) year but within two (2) years of the date of this Note, I agree to
pay a prepayment charge of 2% of the amount being prepaid. The
Note Holder will use all of my prepayments to reduce the amount of
principal that I owe under this Note. However, the Note Holder
may apply my Prepayment to the accrued and unpaid interest on the
Prepayment amount, before applying my Prepayment to reduce the
Principal amount of the Note. If I make a partial prepayment, there
will be no changes in the due date or in the amount of my monthly
payment unless the Note Holder agrees in writing to those changes.
My partial prepayment may reduce the amount of my monthly pay-
ments after the first Change Date following my partial prepayment.
However, any reduction due to my partial prepayment may be offset
by an interest rate increase.
3. Consumer Education
Were borrowers under 2/28-ARMs aware of the price they had to pay
over a twenty-eight year period for two years of low interest during the
Initial Period? The Federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(RESPA) 93 requires lenders and mortgage brokers to give their custom-
ers an information booklet called "Buying Your Home" 94 that is pre-
pared by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 95
"Buying Your Home" is designed to help perspective borrowers under-
stand "the home buying, home financing, and settlement process. ' 96 The
current version is twenty-two pages long. "Shopping for a Loan" is dis-
cussed in Article II on pages five to eight. Its reference to ARM loans
reads as follows:
If you apply for a variable rate loan, also known as an adjustable rate
mortgage ("ARM"), a disclosure and booklet required by the Truth
in Lending Act will further describe the ARM.
That booklet is titled "Consumer Handbook on Adjustable Rate Mort-
gages" and also measures twenty-two pages. Article III of "Buying Your
Home" discusses "Your Settlement Cost" on pages fourteen to twenty-
two. Amongst others, there are Sections on "Sales/Broker's Commis-
sion," "Items Payable in Connection with Loan,' 97 "Escrow Account De-
93. 12 U.S.C. § 2601.
94. See http://www.mortgagesfinancingandcredit.org/mortgages/buying-home-settle-
ment/costsl.htm.
95. Office of Housing-Federal Housing Administration.
96. See Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, http://www.hud.gov.
97. Such as "Credit Report Fee" or "Assumption Fee."
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posits" and "Lead-Based Paint Inspections." We find that the booklet's
overall character is best expressed by Article III's last Section:
Total Settlement Charges: The sum of all fees in the borrower's col-
umn entitled 'Paid from Borrower's Funds at Settlement' is placed
here. This figure is then transferred to line 103 of Section J, 'Settle-
ment charges to borrower' in the Summary of Borrower's Transac-
tion on page 1 of the HUD-1 Settlement Statement and added to the
purchase price. The sum of all the settlement fees paid by the seller
are transferred to line 502 of Section K, Summary of Seller's Trans-
action on page 1 of the HUD-1 Settlement Statement.
Who, other than accountants and lawyers, understands these instruc-
tions? Thus, such booklets-written in a language from lawyers to law-
yers-were of little help because "almost no one ever reads them before
signing."98
4. Financial Consequences
The Practising Law Institute (PLI), holding a "Subprime Institute" in
September of 2008, describes the financial consequences to a borrower
under a 30-year Fixed-Rate Mortgage and a 2/28-ARM loan, each in the
amount of US$ 200 thousand with the following examples:99
Fixed-Rate Mortgage 2/28-ARM
Interest Rate 7.5%. 7% for Years 1-2, then adjusting to
Index Rate plus Margin, subject to
annual Adjustment Caps:
10% Adjustment Cap in Year 3;
11.5% Adjustment Cap in Year 4;
13% Adjustment Cap in Years 5-30.
Required Monthly Payments
(including$ 200 per month for real estate tax and insurance escrow)
Years 1-2 $1,598 $1,531
Year 3 $1,598 $1,939
Year 4 $1,598 $2,152
Years 5-30 $1,598 $2,370
If we add these numbers, we will get the following results: Under the
fixed-rate mortgage, the borrower would owe the total amount of US$
575,280100 (including certain estimated costs for real estate tax and insur-
ance escrow) if he purchased a home. Under the 2/28-ARM, he may be
exposed to a maximum total amount of US$ 825,294101 (including certain
98. James R. Hagerty, New Mortgages Rules Aimed at Consumer, WALL ST. J., Nov.
12, 2008, at D3.
99. ROBERTA K. MCINERNEY, FINANCIAL INSTITUTION GUIDANCE IN PLI COURSE
HANDBOOK, SUBPRIME CREDIT CRISIS: EVERYTHING You NEED TO KNOW 15
(Practicing Law Inst. 2008). See also FDIC, Statements of Policy, http://
www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-5200.html.
100. Thirty years = 360 months. 360 x $1,598 = $575,280.
101. Years one to two = twenty-four months. 24 x $1,531 = $36,744. Year three =
twelve months. 12 x $1,939 = $23,268. Year four= twelve months. 12 x $2,152 =
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estimated costs for real estate tax and insurance escrow). Two years of
lower interest payments on a loan in the amount of US$ 200,000 may
therefore be 'made up' by an amount of up to US$ 250,014.
The Conference of State Bank Supervisors, also looking at 2/28-ARMs,
came to similar conclusions.102 By way of example, a 2/28-ARM loan in
the amount of US$ 200,000 with an initial fixed-rate of 7% may 'typically'
reset to LIBOR plus percent. 10 3 Thus, if the LIBOR designated by the
note at the time of the application for the loan equals 5.5%,10 4 mortgage
brokers and lenders should treat such loan as if it was a fixed-rate mort-
gage with an interest rate of 11.5%,105 regardless of the interest rate
charged during the Initial Period or any Adjustment Cap.106 Similarly,
the borrower would owe US$ 1,531 per month during the Initial Period
and an estimated US$ 2,156 per month during the Floating Period on this
loan, including US$ 200 per month for real estate tax and insurance es-
crow during the entire amortization period.10 7 This represents a 41% in-
crease in payment amount on the first Reset Date1 08 and would expose
the borrower to a total amount of US$ 761,160109 (including certain esti-
mated costs for real estate tax and insurance escrow) because of his home
purchase. The difference between the 'typical' and the maximum expo-
sure in connection with a 2/28 ARM 110 in the amount of US$ 200,000 is
therefore US$ 64,134, while the 'typical' exposure is still US$ 185,880
over the total amount of a 7.5% fixed-rate mortgage.
In addition to determining the payment increase on the first Reset
Date, the Conference of State Bank Supervisors puts the increase into
perspective. The annual income of a borrower, who would 'typically'
take out a loan in this amount,111 is US$ 42,000 per year.1 12 His initial
debt-to-income (DTI) ratio is therefore forty-four percent; upon the first
Reset Date it would increase to sixty-two percent. 113
$25,824. Years five through thirty = 312 months. 312 x $2,370 = $739,440. $36,744
+ $23,268 + $25,824 + $739,440 = $825,294.
102. Conference of State Bank Supervisors, supra note 83.
103. Id. at n. 8.
104. Six months USD LIBOR ranged from 1.75000 percent to 4.56625 percent during
2008.
105. This equals Margin plus Index Rate = 6 percent + 5.5 percent.
106. Conference of State Bank Supervisors, supra note 83, at n.8.
107. Id. at n.14.
108. Id.
109. Years one to two = twenty-four months. 24 x $1,531 = $36,744. Years three
through thirty = 336. 336 x $2,156 = $724,416. $36,744 + $724,416 = $761,160.
110. That amortizes over thirty years.
111. The median income of all households in 2006 was $48,201.00. U.S. CENSUS BU-
REAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES: 2009, TABLE 669.
112. Conference of State Bank Supervisors, supra note 83, at n. 14.
113. Id.
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D. SECURITIZATION IMPLICATIONS1 1 4
Mortgage securitization provided the cash that started lending to sub-
prime borrowers, and subprime lending provided the cash that kept mort-
gage securitization going. By transferring default risks to Wall Street and
then to the financial markets, mortgage securitization also changed the
industry's business model. When loans transferred into pools were diver-
sified not only by geography but also by creditworthiness of the borrow-
ers, such transfers became even harder to parse. Structuring risk through
securitization was supposed to make risk more manageable, by using se-
nior/subordinate shifting of interest and excess spread/overcollateraliza-
tion structures in one transaction, however, additional complexity was
created. 115 For the person not directly involved in the respective transac-
tion, the risks securitized became easily overlooked; a false sense of se-
curity was created. 116
1. Self Interest
Mortgage securitization supported a decline in lending standards. By
shifting the industry's business model, 117 securitization 'atomized' the
loan process. 118 It created a chain of intermediaries, 19 running from bro-
ker, via mortgage lender and Wall Street, to investors.1 20
a. Loss of Responsibility
The effect was that (i) the chain-link making the credit decision was not
connected to the chain-link bearing the default risk, and (ii) each inter-
mediary-link could deny responsibility for the actions of the others.121
Just as much as the desire for higher commissions,1 22 this aspect of securi-
tization explains why home loans to low-income borrowers became at-
tractive to the industry.123 Gary Gorton came to the following
conclusion:124
114. Eggert, supra note 36, at 534. See also Richard C. Jordan, Will the Bubble Burst?
Some Subprime Lessons for Mexico, Latin America's Leader in Asset
Securitizations, 42 INT'L LAW. 1179 (2008).
115. Gorton, supra note 33, at 24.
116. Some financial institutions had been trying to assess the fall out of the subprime
mortgage crisis for over one year. Cf. Riding out the subprime crisis, THE ECONO-
MIST, Nov. 4, 2007.
117. See section above titled "Pyramid Scheme."
118. Kurt Eggert, referring to: Subprime Mortgage Market Turmoil: Examining the Role
of Securitzation Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and Investments, at
8 (Apr. 17, 2007) (statement of Michael Jacobides) available at http://bank-
ing.senate.gov/public/ files/eggert.pdf.
119. See generally PAUL MUOLO & MATHEW PADILLA, CHAIN OF BLAME, How WALL
STREET CAUSED THE MORTGAGE AND CREDIT CRISIS (2008).
120. Eggert, supra note 118, at 8.
121. Eggert, supra note 36, at 552.
122. See section above titled "Pyramid Scheme."
123. Karl Gelles, Why banks are Squeezing Credit Card Holders, USA TODAY, Nov. 10,
2008, at Al.
124. Gorton, supra note 33, at 76.
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The design of subprime mortgages is unique in that they are linked
to house price appreciation. The securitization of subprime mort-
gages is also unique. Because subprime mortgages are financed
through a chain of securities and structures, investors could not eas-
ily determine the location and extent of the risk. Information was
lost. The house price declines led to a fear of losses that could not be
measured because the subprime risk had been spread around the
globe opaquely. The available information was on the side of the
market that produced the chain of structures; outside investors knew
much less. The problem is that the magnitude of the structures, and
their impenetrability by outsiders, was not completely understood; it
was not common knowledge.
b. Originate-to-Distribute
Another aspect of mortgage securitization is its transformation of non-
liquid assets into exchange traded securities. While in 1990, US$ 380 bil-
lion, in 1995, US$ 348 billion, and in 2000, US$ 684 billion of mortgage-
backed securities were issued, such numbers skyrocketed to US$ 3.1 tril-
lion in 2003, US$ 1.8 trillion in 2004, and US$ 2.0 trillion in 2005, 2006,
and 2007, respectively. 12 5 Because mortgage-backed securities became so
popular, at one point, home loans were not originated to provide financ-
ing to borrowers, they were originated to induce borrowers into financing
(or refinancing) in order to create fees and assets for securitization pools.
From chain-link to chain-link, however, the pictorial, 'real' problems of
the respective financed property, such as location and character of the
home or creditworthiness of the borrower, disappeared behind a veil of
letteral abstractions. Some therefore hold that this "originate-to-dis-
tribute" approach offers the best explanation for the subprime mortgage
crisis: 126
The originate-to-distribute model ... created some severe incentive
problems, which are referred to as... agency problems, in which the
agent (the originator of the loans) did not have the incentives to act
fully in the interest of the principal (the ultimate holder of the loan).
Originators had every incentive to maintain origination volume, be-
cause that would allow them to earn substantial fees, but they had
weak incentives to maintain loan quality.1 27
c. Only Pieces of the Puzzle
The above listed reasons, however, should not be overstated. Home
loan originators suffered from the subprime mortgage crisis along with
125. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2009, TA-
BLE 1159.
126. Gorton, supra note 33, at 68.
127. Frederic Mishkin, Speech at the U.S. Policy Forum in New York City: Leveraged
Losses: Lessons from the Mortgage Meltdown (Feb. 29, 2008) available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/mishkin2008O229a.htm.
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the rest of the industry, as losses were suffered up and down the chain.1 28
House price depreciation was the single most important factor that hit all
links. The decline in lending standards is therefore "only a piece of the
puzzle.112 9 The widespread irrationality of subprime lending was based
on the belief that the prices for houses would not fall. 130
2. Accounting
At the same time, U.S. generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP) did not only enhance the letteral appearance of ABS issues,
they did not expose the consequences of subprime lending either. And
when the subprime mortgage crisis began, GAAP contributed to its
acceleration.
a. Special Purpose Vehicles
Wall Street pools home loans in special purpose vehicles. FASB Inter-
pretation No. 46, Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities, revised De-
cember 2003 (FIN 46R) 13 1 and Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 140, Accounting for Transfers and Services of Financial As-
sets and Extinguishments of Liabilities, issued September 2000 (FAS
140)132 govern the accounting for such special purpose vehicles. FIN 46
was originally issued in January 2003 to govern the kind of off-balance-
sheet vehicles whose sudden return to the group accounts wreaked havoc
on Enron Corp. FIN 46R measures seventy-nine pages, FAS 140 is 142
pages long; both are of frightening complexity. 133 Their bottom line,
however, is scarily simple: Special purpose vehicles used for securitization
may still not have to be consolidated.
That is why certain risks did not exist for outsiders. A need for more
funding and more capital was not apparent. Pooling subprime mortgage
loans created a considerable cluster risk, a warning signal for the markets.
Such signal did, however, not readily appear in the group accounts of
Wall Street, as value changes of assets in the securitized pools were ab-
sorbed by the special purpose vehicles and not by the group. If assets are
controlled by the special purpose vehicle and risks are regarded as being
128. Gorton, supra note 33, at 69.
129. Gorton, supra note 33, at 75.
130. Id.
131. Financial Accounting Standards Board [FASB], FASB Interpretation No. 46, Con-
solidation of Variable Interest Entities (revised Dec. 2003), available at, http://
www.fasb.org/fin46r.pdf [hereinafter FIN 46R].
132. FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 140, Accounting for
Transfers and Services of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities, (is-
sued Sept, 2000), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fasl40.pdf [hereinafter FAS
140].
133. Cf. Billy v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 750-752 (Cal. 1992); Bernhard
Grossfeld, Comparative Corporate Governance: Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles v. International Accounting Standards?, 28 N. C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 847, 853 (2003).
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dispersed effectively 134 such variable interest entities will not be consoli-
dated and do not appear in the financial statements of the group. 135 Spe-
cial purpose vehicles used in connection with securitizations therefore
continued to make a 'mockery' of the disclosure rules for public
companies. 136
FIN 46R and FAS 140 have since come under public scrutiny. The Fi-
nancial Accounting Standards Board has proposed amendments: 137 on
September 15, 2008, it issued two exposure drafts-Amendments to FASB
Interpretation No. 46 (R) 138 and Accounting for Transfers of Financial As-
sets, an amendment of FASB Statement No. 140.139
b. Fair Value Accounting
U.S. GAAP did not, however, only affect the origination side of securi-
tization. Wall Street was unable to move all of its ABS issues into the
markets. It and other financial institutions hold ABS as part of their
portfolio. A new accounting technique named 'mark-to-market' account-
ing, introduced during the onset of the subprime mortgage crisis, caught
the industry off guard and exacerbated the problems.
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157, Fair Value Mea-
surements, issued September 2006 (FAS 157)140 became effective for fi-
nancial statements issued for fiscal years beginning after November 15,
2007, and interim periods within those fiscal years. FAS 157 changed the
way companies have to report the value of most of their assets. Accord-
ing to FAS 157, the reported values must reflect the prices a company
would receive if such assets were sold "in an orderly transaction between
market participants at the measurement date." Because reports are due
each quarter, the measurement is performed every three months. By re-
quiring regular evaluations, FAS 157 shifted important power from man-
agement to accounting firms. 141 But FAS 157 did more than putting
accountants at the fore of decision making about the valuation of a com-
134. And no single party holds an interest or combination of interests that effectively
recombines such risks.
135. Gary Gorton & Nicholas S. Souleles, Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization
(FRB Philadelphia, Working Paper No. 05-21, 2005), available at http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=713782; Jalal Soroosh & Jack Ciesielski,
Accounting for Special Purpose Entities Revised: FASB Interpretation 46 (R), CPA
JOURNAL, July 2004.
136. Stephen Schwarzman, Some Lessons of the Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4,
2008, at A19.
137. See FASB Board Minutes for May & June 2008, available at http://www.fasb.org/
board-meeting-minutes/board-meetingminutes.shtml.
138. FASB, Amendments to FASB Interpretation No. 46 (R) (Sept. 14, 2008), available
at http://www.fasb.org/draft/ed-amend-fin46r.pdf.
139. FASB, Accounting for Transfers of Financial Assets, an amendment of FASB State-
ment No. 140 (Sept. 14, 2008), available at http://www.fasb.org/draft/ed-transfers_
financialassets-amend-stl40.pdf.
140. FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157, Fair Value Measure-
ments, issued September 2006 (FAS 157)(effective Nov. 15, 2007)http://www.fasb.
org/pdf/aopFAS157.pdf.
141. Gorton, supra note 33, at 64.
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pany's assets. Because marking-to-market is also applied to hard-to-
value assets for which there is no readily observable market, when liquid-
ity dries out, no market prices occur and such asset must be written down
substantially.
As ABS are typically held for long term investment, even when traded
on an exchange, their market is not very broad. The liquidity drought
caused by subprime mortgage crisis therefore destroyed their fungibility
and eliminated their value. Mortgage-backed securities were priced not
in terms of probability of default, but in terms of what such securities
would fetch if they had to be sold at the measurement date. Over the
course of the subprime mortgage crisis, ABS prices plummeted below any
value determined by the risk of default. In April 2008, for example, the
Bank of England estimated that, based on actuarial methods, the credit
losses in connection with this crisis would eventually reach US$ 170 bil-
lion, 142 whereas, following mark-to-market valuation, mortgage-backed
securities had already lost around US$ 380 billion of their value.1 43
Section 132 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
(EES Act)1 44 restated the Securities and Exchange Commission's author-
ity to suspend the application of fair value accounting rules "if the Com-
mission determines that is necessary or appropriate in the public interest
and is consistent with the protection of investors." Section 133 of the
EES Act requires the Securities and Exchange Commission, in consulta-
tion with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the
Secretary of the Treasury, to conduct a study on mark-to-market account-
ing, including, but not limited to, its (i) effects on a financial institution's
balance sheet, and (ii) impact on the quality of financial information
available to investors. On December 30, 2008, the Commission published
a study recommending improvements to the existing practice but not sus-
pending mark-to-market accounting.1 45
3. Positive Ratings
The letteral appeal of ABS, accounted for under U.S. GAAP, was
complimented by an easily understandable rating system. Mortgage-
backed security issues are typically divided into different tranches with
different seniority. Losses inside a pool are generally applied to the
tranches in reverse order of seniority. To compensate for the added de-
fault risk, junior tranches offer higher interest rates than senior tranches.
Rating agencies followed this approach: (i) the senior tranche is generally
rated AAA, (ii) the one or more mezzanine tranches, they rate AA to
BB, and (iii) the equity tranches are typically left unrated. As ABS issues
142. Bank of England, Financial Stability Report, 18 (Apr. 2008), available at http://
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/2008/fsrfulIO804.pdf.
143. Id. at 19.
144. 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (2008).
145. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Congressionally-Mandated Study Says
Improve, Do Note Suspend, Fair Value Accounting Standards (Dec. 30, 2008)
available at http:l/sec.gov/news/press/200812008-307.htm.
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became more and more complicated-senior/subordinate shifting of in-
terest and excess spread/overcollateralization structures were combined
in one transaction-because mortgages are not priced on an open mar-
ket, such ratings were based on little tested models. Rating different
mortgage-backed security tranches became extremely difficult. 146 Ste-
phen Joynt of Fitch Ratings remarked: 147 "We weren't able to project
forward."
But what is rating about if not projecting forward? The purported
blindness of the rating agencies is even more surprising, as the cluster
risks created by the pooling of subprime mortgage loans were visible
from the beginning.
4. Pretend InsuranceI48
In an effort to provide against these cluster risks, financial institutions
started engaging in Credit Default Swaps (CDS). A CDS is a credit 'de-
rivative' contract in which the buyer of the CDS makes a series of pay-
ments to the seller and, in exchange, receives a payoff if a specified credit
event occurs. Such credit event is typically the default of a bond or a
loan. 149 It is, however, not necessary for the buyer to be affected by such
credit event. But the lack of an insurable interest is not the only differ-
ence that distinguishes the CDS business from the insurance business.
Unlike an insurance company, the seller of a CDS does not need to be a
regulated entity150 (for example, AIG Financial Products Corp.), and, un-
like an insurance contract, CDS are generally subject to mark-to-market
accounting. 151
During the dawn of the subprime mortgage crisis, however, betting on
the materialization of certain default risks, or other credit events, became
so popular that the notional amounts of outstanding CDS increased to
about US$ 58 trillion (US$ 58,000,000,000,000).152 At the same time, for
example, the volume of all debt securities issued and outstanding in the
146. Aaron Lucchetti & Judith Burns, Moody's CEO Warned Profit Push Posed a Risk
to Quality of Ratings, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2008, at A4, available at http://on-
line.wsj.com/article/SB122471995644960797.html#.
147. Pallavi Gogoi, Credit Rater's Judgment Questioned, USA TODAY, Oct. 23, 2008, at
3B, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=6090528&page=l.
148. See generally Judy J. Kim, Credit Default Swaps Get Attention of U.S Regulators,
BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS, RISK & COMPLIANCE (Nov. 2008); Claus Luttermann,
Kreditversicherung (Credit Default Swaps): Vertrag, Restrukturierung und
Regulierung (Hedge-Fonds, Rating, Schattenbanken), RECHT DER INTER-
NATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT at 737 (Nov. 2008).
149. Less commonly, the credit event that triggers the payoff can be a company's credit
rating being downgraded or a company undergoing restructuring or bankruptcy.
150. Eggert, supra note 36, at 550. (Eggert therefore describes them as "completely
lacking in transparency and completely unregulated.")
151. See above section titled "Fair Value Accounting."
152. Bank for Economic Development, Monetary and Economic Department, OTC de-
rivatives market activity in the second half of 2007, May 2008, at 1, available at http:/
/www.bis.org/publ/otc-hy0805.pdf?noframes=l.
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United States was US$ 29.7 trillion. 153 "To put into [yet another] context
this US$ 58 trillion of value that credit default swaps insure: US$ 58 tril-
lion is more than the gross domestic product of every country on earth,
combined." 154
But the sheer magnitude of the CDS market is not the only circum-
stance that became breathtaking. In April 2008, AIG Financial Products
Corp. committed to pay certain employees retention bonuses in the
amount of US$ 450 million to stay on board. 155 AIG needed such em-
ployees to unwind its CDS business, as they were deemed to be the only
ones who understood the business and were capable of unwinding it.156
By March 2009, its parent company, American International Group, Inc.,
is considered to have received at least US$ 170 billion in U.S. bailout
money since September 2008,157 and AIG Financial Products Corp. is
deemed to have destroyed AIG. 158
The combination of mortgage-backed securities and CDS worked as
paper built Archimedean lever. Unfortunately it failed to pass the real-
world test.159
V. COMPLEXITY
The structural overview shows that the instruments invented to mini-
mize the risks involved in mortgage lending led to unprecedented levels
of complexity. The chain of transactions and the securities involved make
it almost impossible to determine the location and extent of the risk:160
"[It is not possible to penetrate the chain backwards and value the chain
based on the underlying mortgages .... There are (at least) two layers of
structured products in CDOs. Information is lost because of the difficulty
of penetrating to the core assets. '161
153. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2009, TA-
BLE 1159, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2O06pubs/07statab/banking.pdf.
154. Christopher Cox, SEC Chairman, Opening Remarks at SEC Roundtable on Mod-
ernizing the Securities and Exchange Commission's Disclosure System (Oct. 8,
2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spchlOO808cc.htm.
155. Edmund Andrews and Peter Baker, Bonus Money at Troubled A.I.G. Draws
Heavy Criticism, THE N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009, at 1, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/03/16/business/16aig.html.
156. See Jim Zarroli, Obama, Cuomo Target AIG Bonuses, NPR, Mar. 16, 2009, availa-
ble at http://www.npr.orgltemplates/story/story.php?storyId=lO1963181.
157. See Matthew Karnitschnig, Deborah Solomon, Liam Pleven & Jon E. Hilsenrath,
U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit
Dries Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, at Al, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB122156561931242905.html.
158. Monica Langley, Deborah Solomon & Matthew Karnitschnig, Bad Bets and Cash
Crunch Pushed Ailing AIG to Brink, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008, at Al, available
at http:l/online.wsj.com/article/SB122169421247449935.html. Cf. Mollenkamp et
al., supra note 56, at Al; AIG names recipients of its bailout money, CNN, Mar. 16,
2009, http:l/www.cnn.com/2009[US/O3/15/AIG.banks.listlindex.html.
159. Financial WMD, USA TODAY, Oct. 22, 2008, at 8A (and became "financial weap-
ons of mass destruction" ) (quoting Warren Buffet).
160. Gorton, supra note 33, at 45.
161. Gorton, supra note 33, at 61.
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Law therefore became an instrument of complexity, reducing trans-
parency from beginning to end. 16
2
A. AT THE BoTroM
The complexity started with selling ARM loans to borrowers. An
ARM loan does not look too complicated to the expert, but it seems that
borrowers who actually submitted to 2/28-ARMs did not understand their
economic consequences. This is due to the fact, that in matters of interest
we meet imperfect information. The "ignorant borrower"'163 is typically
not familiar with the power of interest and compound interest. 164 He is
not aware of the "Rule of 72"-72 divided by the annual interest rate
provides the number of years it takes for the amount to be actually repaid
on a debt to double.1 6 5 At the bottom we find information asymmetry.
B. ALONG THE LINKS
The complexity of ABS continued along the links. A good example is
Structured Asset Securities Corporation's last registration statement on
Form S-3 (Amendment No. 3) that it filed with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) on June 29, 2007.166 The Structured Asset
Securities Corporation was a special purpose vehicle of Lehman Brothers
Holdings Inc. for the issue of ABS.
The first sample base prospectus contained in this registration state-
ment measures 187 pages plus Index of Principal Terms, Annex A Book-
Entry Procedures, and Annex B Global Clearance, Settlement and Tax
Documentation Procedures. Its Table of Contents is three pages long,
referring to twenty-six chapters. They start with Risk Factors, Descrip-
tion of the Securities, and The Trust Funds, deal with Servicing of Loans,
Credit Support and Derivatives, and conclude with Additional Informa-
tion, Incorporation of Certain Documents by Reference (i.e. more docu-
ments to be aware of) and Reports to Security Holders.
162. Cf. Bernhard Grossfeld, Comparative Corporate Governance: Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles v. International Accounting Standards, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
CoM. REG. 847, 853 (2003).
163. RASHMI DYAL-CHAND, FROM STATUS TO CONTRACT: EVOLVING PARADIGMS
FOR REGULATING CONSUMER CREDIT, THE FUTURE OF CONSUMER CREDIT REG-
ULATIONS 49, 59 (Michelle Kelly-Louw, James P. Nehf & Peter Rott eds., 2008).
164. See generally Mary Spector, Taming the Beast: Payday Loans, Regulatory Efforts,
and Unintended Consequences, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 961 (2008); Steven M. Graves
& Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Laws and the Christian Right: Faith-Based Polit-
ical Power and the Geography of American Payday Loan Regulation, 57 CATH. U.
L. REV. 637 (2008); Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statu-
tory Sleight of Hand: Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92
MINN. L. REV. 1110 (2008).
165. See The Rule of 72, Better Explained, Jan. 25, 2007, available at http://
www.betterexplained.com/articles/the-rule-of-72/.
166. Structured Asset Securities Corp., Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC],
Amendment No. 3 to Registration Statement (S-3){(June 29, 2007), available at
http://www.secinfo.com/dl3f21.umb.htm#1stPage.
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The Index of Principal Terms alone covers four and one-half pages.
Risk Factors are explained on thirty-three pages. They discuss, among
others matters, typical weaknesses of subprime mortgage loans such as
Higher Expected Delinquencies, the effects of Changes in the U.S. Eco-
nomic Conditions as well as Prepayment Premiums, Negative Amortiza-
tion and Geographic Concentration. As characteristic we quote the
explanation of prepayment penalties in connection with home loans:
Many residential mortgage loans, particularly adjustable rate mort-
gage loans, negative amortization mortgage loans and subprime
mortgage loans, require the payment of a prepayment premium in
connection with voluntary prepayments of the mortgage loan made
during the period specified in the related mortgage note. These pre-
payment premiums may discourage borrowers from refinancing their
mortgage loans, and in many cases, may discourage borrowers from
selling the related mortgage property, during the applicable period.
Borrowers who wish to refinance their properties to take advantage
of lower interest rates, or who want to sell their mortgaged property,
may not be able to afford the prepayment premium and may be
more likely to default. You should consider the effect of these pre-
payment premiums on borrowers and the resulting effect on the
yields of your securities. 167
The risk factors end with a global warning:
The Securities May Not Be Suitable Investments. The securities may
not be a suitable investment if you require a regular or predictable
schedule of payment, or payment on any specific date. . . . An in-
vestment in these types of securities involves significant risks and un-
certainties and should only be considered by sophisticated investors
who, either alone or with their financial, tax and legal advisors, have
carefully analyzed the mortgage loans and the securities and under-
stand the risks. 168
After the risk factors, the ABS to be issued by the Structured Asset
Securities Corporation are explained on six and one-half pages. Over
twenty-two pages are spent on the home loans that may be included in a
trust fund; another three and one-half pages describe the underwriting
procedures and standards for such loans. The next part presents on four-
teen and one-half pages the sponsor (Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.),
the depositor (Structured Asses Securities Corporation), and the master
servicer of the loans in the trust fund (Aurora Loan Services LLC), in-
cluding an eleven page section on Servicing before 'the' Servicing of
Loans is explained on another twelve pages.
Altogether, an impressive legal document. We learned, however, the
hard way that subprime mortgage lending created opaque legal construc-
tions and produced securities that did not deliver on one of their core
167. Id. at "Risk Factors-Prepayment Premiums May Affect a Borrower's Ability to
Sell a Mortgaged Property or Refinance a Mortgage Loan, and May Affect the
Yields on Your Securities."
168. Id. at "Risk Factors-The Securities May Not Be Suitable Investments."
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functions-a manageable allocation of risk. Because the markets were
not provided with efficient information that allowed effective pricing, the
markets became self-destructive.
C. AN AVALANCHE OF LETTERS
1 6 9
"All the ills we face. . .can be traced back to illiteracy. "'70
As we look at the legal documents along the risk chain, we are buried
by an avalanche of letters. Certainly, this is a not un-common feature of
Western civilization since the invention of the printing press by Johannes
Gutenberg around 1450. Based on the idea "of the 'autonomy' of law"'171
it, however, washed away pictures and reached gigantic proportions with
Martin Luther's "sola scriptura,"'172 when it was extended far beyond its
religious meaning:
[T]he fact that looking at law as a constant element may easily in-
duce a distorted and limited vision of the external world .... Starting
from rules may lead to select perceptions, and therefore events
themselves, according to a predefined model which often happens to
correspond to an individual's personal views about what rules mean.
Factual interpretation, in short, may easily become normatively
bound. As a result, lawyers often tend to have a preselected and
simplified vision of the social landscape that surrounds them, all the
more so because law, by its own inner logic, 'dychotomizes real-
ity'. ..on the basis of the 'lawful-unlawful' (Recht-Unrecht) discrimi-
nation code.173
Letters became the most reliable instruments for ordering. 174 Cer-
tainly, law requires that we ignore certain complexities of life;175 but in
law, as always, the amount makes the poison: "Iura scripta sunt vigilan-
tibus."'1 76 ("The laws are written for the weary.")-But how watchful
does one have to be to hold one's own? In addition, how are we keeping
a statistical balance, when the line stretches further and further between
parties with different social and educational experiences?
169. Leslie Eaton & Amir Efrati, Lawyers Will Be Lawyers, Dumping More on Juries
Than They Can Process, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2008, at A16, available at http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB122593285676003505.html.
170. Judy Keen, After Hudson's Death, Chicago Vows to Fight Rising Murder Rate,
USA TODAY, Oct. 29, 2008, at 3A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/na-
tion/2008-10-28-hudsonN.htm.
171. Vinzenzo Ferrari, Law and Society Studies and Legal Education, 55 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 495, 497 (2005).
172. See generally Diarmaid MacCulloch, The Reformation: A History (2004). For the
power of the word in the Protestant legal culture see Bernard Hibbitts, The Re-
vision of Law: The Pictorial Turn in American Legal Culture, http://
faculty.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/pictor.htm.
173. Vinzenzo Ferrari, Law and Society Studies and Legal Education, 55 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 495, 497 (2005).
174. Naglee v. Ingersoll, 7 Pa. 185 (1847) ("The black letter of the law.").
175. Amnon Reichman, Law, Literature, and Empathy: Between Withholding and Re-
serving Judgment, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 296, 307 (2006).
176. Cf. Corpus luris Civilis, Digesta 41. 10,24.
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Before the onset of the subprime mortgage crisis, everything appeared
to be well documented. But, in fact, the reality of risks had disappeared
behind a veil of precisely lettered optimism. The sheer amount of detail
oriented legal letters covered-up the complexity of the many transactions
involved in the subprime mortgage fiasco, individually and cumulatively.
Risks were not managed along the links, they hid behind walls of paper
created by each link. Inexperienced, low income borrowers did not un-
derstand what they were getting into. At the same time, investors relied
on more than the protection offered by legal disclosure; they relied on
prudent underwriting practices, backed by Wall Street's good will as fi-
nancial adviser, not just seller. And, finally, it seems like Wall Street did
not know what it was getting into either. The attempt to realize an Amer-
ican dream therefore turned full circle against those in whose favor it was
made.
D. UP TO REALITY-AGAIN
"Our duty is 'reality, reality, reality' however difficult to achieve. 1 77
Recent decisions by Massachusetts courts 178 seem to indicate a return
to reality when discussing home loans with four characteristics: (i) adjust-
able rates, (ii) teaser rates, (iii) debt-to-income ratios exceeding fifty per-
cent, and (iv) loan-to-value ratios of 100% or certain prepayment
penalties. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Appeals Court saw the
situation as follows:179
[I]t is to be expected that the borrower will not be able to meet the
scheduled payments once the 'teaser' rate expires at the close of the
introductory period [i.e. the Initial Period], and the loan will be
'doomed to foreclosure' unless the borrower is able to refinance the
loan at or around the close of the introductory period; and where
loans also have the fourth characteristic [i.e. a loan-to-value ratios of
100% or prepayment penalty], the borrower has no realistic prospect
of being able to refinance should housing prices decline.
The lower Commonwealth of Massachusetts Superior Court had
concluded:180
Given the fluctuations in the housing market and the inherent uncer-
tainties as to how that market will fluctuate over time, this Court
finds that it is unfair for a lender to issue a home mortgage loan
secured by the borrower's principal dwelling that the lender reasona-
bly expects will fall into default once the introductory period ends
177. Bernhard Grossfeld, Global Financial Statements/Local Enterprise Valuation, J.
CORP. L. 337, 362 (2004).
178. Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan and Fremont Gen. Corp., supra note 85;
Massachusetts v. Fremont Investment & Loan & another, Mass. Appeals Ct., Civil
Action No. 08-J-118 (May 2, 2008), available at http://www.goodwinprocter.com/-/
media/F661C77BEC2E46AIBBE14B286BAE48DB.ashx.
179. Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan & another, supra note 178, at 3.
180. Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan and Fremont Gen. Corp., supra note 85,
at 18 et seq.
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unless the fair market value of the home has increased at the close of
the introductory period. To issue a home mortgage loan whose suc-
cess relies on the hope that the fair market value of the home will
increase during the introductory period is as unfair as issuing a home
mortgage loan whose success depends on the hope that the bor-
rower's income will increase during the same period.
The Washington Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy
in November 2008 added the following insight to the picture: 181
[M]arket participants sought higher yields without an adequate ap-
preciation of the risks and failed to exercise proper due diligence. At
the same time, weak underwriting standards, unsound risk manage-
ment practices, increasingly complex and opaque financial products,
and consequent excessive leverage combined to create vulnerabilities
in the system.
The Leaders of the Group of Twenty therefore put "Strengthening
Transparency and Accountability" on top of their "common principles for
reform. 182 Immediate Actions to be taken by March 31, 2009 were to:
183
* ... address weaknesses in accounting and disclosure standards for
off-balance sheet vehicles[;]
* . . . enhance the required disclosure of complex financial instru-
ments by firms to market participants[;] and
0 ... [enhance] the governance of the international accounting stan-
dard setting body.




The story told in this article offers a sad, but nevertheless great, story
for legal edification. It shows, how we lawyers abandoned the legal anal-
ysis of economics, while not noticing how compartmentalized legal regu-
lation became. The law disconnected from economic results, as we failed
to consider the macro-economic consequences of individual acts. At the
same time, the economic analysis of the law did not take notice of these
concerning developments. For the mathematical models used to predict
the markets proved insufficient, 116 when reality exposed their inherent
181. See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Declaration of the Summit on
Financial Markets and the World Economy 1 (Nov. 15, 2008), http://
www.fsforum.org/press/pr-151108.pdf.
182. Id. at 3.
183. Id. at 6.
184. See generally Bernhard Grossfeld, Global Accounting: A Challenge for Lawyers,
supra note 30, at 143; Bernhard Grossfeld, International Financial Reporting Stan-
dards: European Corporate Governance in 0 DIREITO DO BALANCO E AS
NORMAS INTERNACIONALES DE RELATO FINANCEIRO 11 (J. L. Sadanha Sanchez
ed., 2006).
185. Alfred Conard, Macrojustice: A Systematic Approach to Conflict Resolution, 5 GA.
L. REV. 415, 420 (1971); Cf. H. Peyton Young, EQUITY-THEORY AND PRACTICE 6
et seq. (1995).
186. See White, supra note 16.
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weakness. They cannot "cope with illogical and uneconomic factors." 187
Securitization created investment products of international reach that
separated financing from the location of the financed object-though "lo-
cation, location, location" has always been the common and almost hack-
neyed phrase in real estate. It was able to do so, by giving ABS a letteral
appearance through a series of complex, highly regulated transactions,
accounted for under generally accepted principles. The persons involved
in these transactions, however, did not apply the standards of statistical
reasoning and were therefore unaware of their macro-economic impact.
A legal analysis of economics would have detected this development, be-
cause it takes into account that markets depend on systems of law as it
uses such systems as cognitive models. The legal analysis of economics
thereby binds the language of economics to the grammar of a value sys-
tem and limits the power of self-interest according to the moral order of a
society. It sets pragmatic standards for economic interests that are typi-
cally not derailed by illogical economic factors.
We lawyers need to re-embrace this analysis. This does not mean that
we need to conduct extended business studies, 188 we must simply be fact
oriented and observe how our work influences economic reality. This is
more than words, words, words. But it is not more difficult than it is for
economists to analyze the law, and that could be an important lesson
from the subprime mortgage crisis!
187. L. Gordon Crovitz, The 1% Panic, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2008, at 17A.
188. Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law (Yale Law & Economics
Research Paper No. 323, 2005) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=824050; see
also Bernhard Grossfeld, Comparative Accounting, 28 TEX. INT'L. L. J. 233 (1993).
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